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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act' is premised on two fun-
damental policies: remedying employment discrimination 2 and
encouraging settlement of discrimination claims.3 Generally,
these two policies are complementary because by encouraging the
parties tO voluntarily agree to a settlement, employnient
discrimination practices are eliminated without the vulgarities of
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-g (1982)). Section 703 of Title VII provides in per-
tinent part:
It shal be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status an an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
2. The legislative history of Title VII provides that the purpose of the Act "is to eliminate,
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employ-
ment based on race, color, religion or national origin" H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in 1964 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391. 2401. See also Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. 36.44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
3. Explaining Congressional intent to encourage settlement of Title VII cases, the Ninth
Circuit has stated that:
The legal complusion toward voluntary resolution of disputes was given increas-
ed significance in Title VII cases by Congress which made the conciliation pro-
cess the core of Title VII. Until the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the EEOC could
not litigate Even now, the statute states that the EEOC "'shall endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" before resorting to litigation.
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943. 950 n.11 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting from 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1982)). See also EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 719 F.2d 1426, 1435
(9th Cir. 1983) (Schroeder. J., dissenting); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (5th Cir.
1977): 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
Congress' desire to encourage settlement of Title VII actions is quite evident in the legislative
history. For example, facilitation of settlements was a major concern in the debate whether
or not to give final authority under the Act to the federal judiciary. Several members of the
House stated that giving final authority under the Act to the federal judiciary would result
in the "settlement of complaints occur(ring) more rapidly and with greater frequency." H.R.
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protracted litigation. Given the remedial and settlement policies
of Title VII, class actions are particularly well-suited for adjudica-
tion of class-wide discrimination claims.4 Utilization of class ac-
tions makes Title VII a more effective tool for eliminating employ-
ment discrimination by providing relief to persons who would
otherwise be disinclined or unable to bring a lawsuit. Thus, as a
result of the availability of class relief, more people benefit from
Title VII. Moreover, class actions often result in settlements, 5
which makes Title VII relief available sooner than if each claim had
to be litigated separately.
Civil rights class actions are often certified 6 under subdivision
(b)(2) of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Under
rule 23, class action judgments are binding on all members of the
class.8 Thus, a crucial issue in evaluating the remedial and settle-
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2. reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355. 2515.
Conversely, Representative Kastenmeir expressed his concern that giving final authority to
the judiciary would impede the remedial objective of Title VII because it would result in slow
and costly court proceedings. Id. at 2411. In addition, the preamble to the Senate bill (the House
bill was passed in lieu of the Senate bill) states that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act was
"to achieve peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial... discrimina-
tion... :'S. REP. No. 372. 88th Cong.. 2d Sess. 2. reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS
2355, 2353.
4. The Advisory Committee note to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates
that subdivision (b)(2) of rule 23 was designed, at least in part, to facilitate the bringing of
civil rights class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) advisory committee note. 39 F.R.D. 98. 102.
Subdivision (b) of rule 23 provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition ... (2) the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby mak-
ing appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). See also 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4 23.40(1)
(2d ed. 1985); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1775-76 (1972
& Supp. 1985). But cf. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon. 457 U.S. 147. 159 (1982) (In the context of
holding that rule 23(a) must be strictly adhered to, the Court stated: "We find nothing in (Title
VII) to indicate that Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion of class ac-
tion litigation:'); Rutherglen, Notfica Scope and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions. 69 VA.
L. REV. 11, 25 (1983) ("The argument from the Advisory Committee note to rule 23 reads too
much into the Advisory Committee's statement that civil rights actions are illustrative of class
actions appropriate for certification under subdivision (b)(2):').
5. See Wolfram, The Antibotics Class Actions, A.B.F. RES. J. 251. 357 (1976). noted in J.
LANDERS& J. MARTIN. CIVIL PROCEDURE 511 (1981) (as of 1976, only two class actions of major
significance had gone to trial since rule 23 was amended in 1966).
6. Certification is provided for in subdivision (c)(1) of rule 23 which provides in part: "As
soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court
shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained:' FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1).
7. For the pertinent text of subdivision (b)(2), see supra note 4. For examples of civil rights
class actions certified under subdivision (b)(2), see EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.. 515 F.2d 301.
310 (6th Cir. 1975). vacated. 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.. 494
F.2d 211, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1974). modified 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978). cert. denied. 439
U.S. 1115 (1979); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791. 802 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismiss-
ed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. supra note 4. § 1775.
8. Subdivision (c)(3) of rule 23 provides: "The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
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ment objectives of Title VII is the extent to which a rule 23 class
action judgment precludes members of the class from relitigating
their Title VII claims in a subsequent action.
The common law doctrine of res judicata9 consists of two
distinct rules of preclusion: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
Under the claim preclusion rule, a final judgment extinguishes all
rights of the plaintiff against the defendant arising out of the same
transaction or series of connected transactions. 10 Under the
issue preclusion rule, if a party has had the opportunity to fully
and fairly litigate an issue it will be precluded from relitigating
the same issue in another action.1 In class actions, the judgment
is res judicata to all class members, not just the named parties.12
Thus, by making the judgment binding on unnamed class
members, rule 23 not only embodies the doctrine of res judicata
but expands the scope of the preclusion beyond the common
law.1 3 Nevertheless, the class action judgment will not preclude
the actions of individual class members who were not adequately
represented by the class representatives in the prior action.
14
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class:' FED. R. Civ. P. 231c)(3).
See also id. advisory committee note 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06.
9. In this Comment, the following terminology has been adopted from the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982):
(m)erger-the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment for plaintiff (§ 18);
bar-the extinguishment of a claim in ajudgment for defendant (§ 19); and issue
preclusion-the effect of the determination of an issue in another action be-
tween the parties on the same claim (direct estoppel) or a different claim (col-
lateral estoppel) (§ 27).
Id. ch. 3 introductory note. The Restatement uses "res judicata" as encompassing all three
of these concepts. Id. In addition, the term "claim" is used in this Comment to embrace '..
all the remedial rights of the plaintiff against the defendant growing out of the relevant trans-
action (or series of connected transactions)... :'Id. § 24 comment a. The phrase "claim preclu-
sion" conveys the ideas of bar and merger collectively. See Id. § 24 introductory note. The
Supreme Court has expressed its approval of the Restatement's use of terminology in this area.
See Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 104 S. Ct. 892, 894 n.1 (1984).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). See also Migra v. Warren City
School Dist., 104 S. Ct. 892, 894 n.1 (1984): RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18-26.
11. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 104 S. Ct. 892,894 n.1 (1984); Allen v. McCurry.
449 U.S. 90. 94 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322. 326 n.5 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§
27-28.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(3). Note, however, that the res judicata effect of a judgment can
only be determined in a subsequent proceeding. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10,
§ 1789. at 176.
13. The general rule of res judicata is that a final judgment is not binding on anyone who
has not been designated as a party and been served with process. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER.
supra note 4, § 1789. See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
14. See Hansberry v. Lee 311 U.S. 32 (1940). The adequacy of representation requirement
is stated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: "One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if... the representative par-
ties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class:' FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See also
infra text accompanying notes 123-67.
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In summary, rule 23 operates as a double-edged sword in Title
VII actions. On the one hand, the class action device facilitates the
adjudication and settlement of class-wide discrimination claims.
On the other hand, the class action judgment extinguishes all class
rights arising out of the claim adjudicated in the action, and
thereby precludes any subsequent action by an absent class
member based on the same claim.' 5
II. EEOC V. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The preclusive effect of the class action judgment is especially
harsh when a Title VII class includes future employees because the
prior action does not afford these employees the opportunity to
voice objections to the named parties' representation of the class.
EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Center 6 is an example of the
harsh preclusive effect of the class action judgment on the Title
VII rights of future employees included in a rule 23 class. In that
case, the Ninth Circuit held 17 that the doctrine of res judicata
operated to bar the employment discrimination claims of three
employees of the Children's Hospital Medical Center. The court
reasoned that the employees were bound by the remedial provi-
sions of a consent decree entered against the Hospital six years
earlier in Clayton v. Children's Hospital Medical Center.'8
Clayton was a Title VII class action brought under subdivision
(b)(2) of rule 23.19 The class included all past, present, and future
black employees of the Hospital. 20 The district court approved a
15. It seems clear that res judicata is fully applicable in Title VII class actions. See Cooper
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond. 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984). One authority, however, argues that
"[clourts have departed from the usual rule that claim preclusion extends to all claims arising
out of the same transaction or occurence as the claims that were actually litigated and. in-
stead, have limited claim preclusion to those claims that were actually litigated:" The reason
for this, he says. is that failure to assert a claim is strong evidence of inadequate representa-
tion. Rutherglen. supra note 4. at 76-77. The force of Rutherglen's argument is mitigated by
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Migra v. Warren City School Dist.. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
While Migra was not a class action, the Court did hold that a state court judgment is resjudicata
to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in federal court when the § 1983 issue could have been litigated
in the state court proceeding. Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 104 S. Ct. 892, 897-98 (1984).
See infra note 36 for the text of § 1983.
16. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated. 702 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.).
rev'd on other grounds. 719 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1983).
17. A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center.
30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961 (9th Cir. 1982). The court was divided in its decision. Judges
Schroeder and Kelleher composed the majority; Judge Poole dissented.
18. No. 74-2165 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1976) (order approving consent decree).
19. See EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961 (9th
Cir. 1982) for a discussion of the facts at issue in Clayton.
20. The class in the Clayton action was certified on April 6, 1976. It was described as "'all
past, present and future Black employees of defendant Children's Hospital Medical Center and
all past, present, and future Black applicants for employment at Children's Hospital Medical
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consent decree that enjoined employment discrimination against
class members during the life of the decree. 21 In the decree,
"discrimination" was defined by the terms of Title VII. As a result,
any conduct violating Title VII would constitute a breach of the
consent decree.2 2 In addition, the decree established a mandatory
grievance procedure that provided for a final and binding resolu-
tion of all grievances involving an alleged violation of any provi-
sion of the consent decree 23 A Consent Decree Grievance Commit-
tee was created with the responsibility of resolving all grievances
arising under the decree. Thus, given that the Hospital's promise to
refrain from future discrimination was a provision of the decree
and was the equivalent of the Title VII proscription of discrimina-
tion, the Clayton decree in essence provided that all Title VII claims
by the Hospital employees were subject only to final and binding
resolution by the Grievance Committee. In 1979, three employees,
hired after entry of the decree, filed grievances alleging that the
Hospital had discriminated against them during that year.
Although the Grievance Committee accepted some of the claims,
the majority were rejected. 24 Prior to filing the grievances,
however, the employees had filed charges with the EEOC alleging
the same facts as in the grievances. Investigating the charges, the
EEOC sought enforcement of information subpeonas in federal
district court, but enforcement was denied.2 5 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court decision and held that the EEOC
had no jurisdiction to investigate because the employees were
precluded from bringing a Title VII suit.26
Center." Id. at 961 (citing Clayton v. Hosp. Medical Center, No. 74-2165 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1976)
(order approving consent decree)).
21. See EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961 (9th
Cir. 1982) (Poole. J.. dissenting) for a general description of the terms of the decree.
22. The district court, in EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Center. found that the Title
V1i claims of the employees were "within the injunction against discrimination" in the decree.
On appeal. Judge Schroeder, writing for the majority, stated that the decree "purported to
establish the exclusive method for resolution of Title VII employment discrimination claims
raised by members of the class:' Id. at 962.
23. See id. at 965 n.2 (Poole. J., dissenting) for a detailed description of the grievance
procedure.
24. See id. at 962.
25. Section 706(b) of Title VII authorizes the EEOC to investigate charges that are properly
filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
26. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961 (9th Cir.
1982). The res judicata issues raised by Children's Hospital have unfortunately been left
unresolved. On rehearing en banc. the Ninth Circuit held that the EEOC had jurisdiction to
investigate the claims of the hospital employees. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 702
F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1983). While the court acknowledged the complexity of the res judicata
issue it decided the case on another ground. The court reasoned that res judicata is an affir-
mative defense and that the EEOC's agency jurisdiction is not abrogated when the party being
investigated may have a valid defense to a subsequent suit by the agency. Id.
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EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Center is particularly
troubling because it is unclear whether the court was giving
preclusive effect to the Grievance Committee decision or the con-
sent decree itself.2" On this issue, the following two arguments
shall be presented: (1) if the Ninth Circuit was giving preclusive
effect to the Grievance Committee decision, Children's Hospital is
in direct conflict with recent Supreme Court decisions; 28 (2) if
the Ninth Circuit was giving preclusive effect to the Clayton con-
sent decree, the court erred because Children's Hospital and
Clayton did not arise out of the same series of connected
transactions. 29
Notwithstanding these arguments, there may be cases in which
future employees, included in a class action consent judgment,
bring a subsequent Title VII action that, unlike Children's Hospital,
is based on the same series of connected transactions as the
original class action.30 It shall be argued that in such cases
(1) the consent judgment should preclude subsequent Title VII ac-
tions;31 and (2) future employees should be included in the Title
VII class action and bound by the judgment. 3 2
III. THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE DECISION
A. The Preclusive Effect of an Arbitral Decision Under a Collective
Bargaining Agreement
On two occasions the Supreme Court has held that an arbitral
decision denying an employee's allegation that the employer
violated a nondiscrimination clause does not preclude relitigation
of the same claim in federal court. In Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver,33 the Court held that an employee's Title VII action was
not precluded by prior submission of the same claim to final and
binding arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. The
Court reasoned that the contractual and statutory procedures were
not mutually exclusive, and that the employee could pursue both
27. The majority stated that it was applying res judicata. Id. at 964. If the court was giv-
ing preclusive effect to the grievance committee decision, then both claim preclusion (bar) and
issue preclusion (direct estoppel) were applicable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
84. Settlements, however, do not result in issue preclusion because issues within the scope
of the settlement have not been fully litigated. See id. at § 27. Therefore. if preclusive effect
was given to the consent decree, only claim preclusion was applicable.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 33-69.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 70-94.
30. It must be noted, however, that the majority assumed Clayton and Children's Hospital
involved the same series of connected transactions. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 95-122.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 123-167.
33. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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remedies independently.34 In McDonald v. City of West Branch,3 5
the Court extended Gardner-Denver to actions brought under sec-
tion 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.36 In both cases, the Court
reasoned that the arbitration process does not adequately protect
the federal rights that Title VII and section 1983 were designed
to safeguard.3 7 Thus, it is clear that, in employment discrimina-
tion cases, arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment is not a satisfactory substitute for a judicial proceeding.3 8
Collective bargaining agreements commonly contain broad
34. Id. at 52-53.
35. 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Sec-
tion 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who under color of any statute. ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges. or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
37. The Court in Gardner-Denver and McDonald listed four reasons why arbitration is in-
ferior to a judicial proceeding:
(1) An arbitrator may not have the expertise required to resolve the complex
legal questions that arise in civil rights actions;
f2) An arbitrator's authority derives solely from the contract;
(3) The union has exclusive control of processing the grievance, and vigorous-
ly processing the employee's grievance may not be in the union's best in-
terests; and
(4) Arbitral fact finding is generally not the equivalent of judicial fact finding.
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799. 1803-04 (1984): Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,
418 U.S. 36. 56-59 (1974).
38. Cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (employee's cause
of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act not barred by prior submission of claim to
grievance committee set up by collective bargaining agreement). The new Restatement (Second)
of Judgments is consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine.
and McDonald. Section 84(2) of the Restatement provides that -[ain award by arbitration with
respect to a claim does not preclude relitigation of the same or a related claim based on the
same transaction if a scheme of remedies permits assertion of the second claim notwithstand-
ing the award regarding the first claim:' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(2). Section
84(3) provides that determination of an issue in arbitration does not preclude relitigation of
that issue if giving preclusive effect to the arbitral decision would be incompatible with a legal
policy or if the arbitral procedure would be inadequate. Id. at § 84(3).
There is an argument. however, that under certain limited circumstances res judicata ef-
fect may be given to an arbitral decision in an employment discrimination case. The Gardner-
Denver Court stated that when "an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an
employees Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight:" Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.. 415 U.S. 36.60 n.21 (1974). If "great weight" is interpreted to include resjudicata
effect, then a court could consider all of the factors set forth in Gardner-Denver's footnote 21
when deciding whether to give res judicata effect to a consent decree grievance committee deci-
sion in a subsequent Title VII suit. However, "great weight" is more properly interpreted to
mean only that in a Title VII action a court may accord evidentiary significance to a prior ar-
bitral decision. This reading is consistent with McDonald in which the Court stated that an
arbitral decision is admissible as evidence in a § 1983 action. McDonald v. City of West Branch,
104 S. Ct. 1799, 1803-04 (1984). It seems then that an arbitral decision is admissible as
evidence in a Title VII action. but may not be given res judicata effect even if the court con-
siders all of the factors set forth in Gardner-Denver's footnote 21.
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grievance and arbitration clauses providing for final and binding
resolution of all disputes arising under the contract. 39 Courts will
generally give effect to an arbitral decision so long as it draws its
essence from the collective agreement. 40 Similar to collective
bargaining agreements, consent decrees are agreed-upon com-
promises of conflicting interests.41 Just as a collective bargaining
agreement may contain procedures for arbitrating disputes aris-
ing from the agreement, a consent decree may contain a similar
provision for resolution of disputes arising from the day-to-day ad-
ministration of the decree.
If the Ninth Circuit in Children's Hospital was giving preclusive
effect to the Grievance Committee decision, its facts seem in-
distinguishable from those in Gardner-Denver and McDonald.42
The collective bargaining agreement in Gardner-Denver and
McDonald, and the consent decree in Children's Hospital, each con-
tained a nondiscrimination clause, as well as a provision for final
and binding resolution of disputes arising out of the agreement.
Moreover, in each case an employee unsuccessfully processed a
grievance alleging that the employer violated the nondiscrimina-
tion clause and filed an employment discrimination action alleg-
ing the same operative facts that comprised the grievance.
In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court rejected the employer's
argument that the employee waived all rights under Title VII by
choosing to process his grievance through arbitration.43 While
the Court noted that an employee may voluntarily and knowingly
waive his Title VII rights as part of a settlement,44 it held that in
no event would submission of a grievance to arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of the agreement constitute a voluntary
and knowing waiver of Title VII rights.45 In McDonald, the Court
rejected a similar argument that an arbitral decision should be
given preclusive effect under the Full Faith and Credit Statute 46
39. See generally R. GORMAN. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 541-43 (1976).
40. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.. 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.. 363 U.S. 574 (1960):
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (these cases are com-
monly known as the Steelworkers Trilogy).
41. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975).
42. Note, however, that Children's Hospital predates McDonald.
43. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 49-52 (1974).
44. Id. at 52 & n.15.
45. Id. at 52. The Supreme Court, however, did not define "voluntary and knowing" consent.
46. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1802 (1984). The Full Faith and
Credit Statute provides in pertinent part:
[Jiudicial proceedings of any court of any... State, Territory, or Possession....
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The Court held that the Statute requires only that res judicata ef-
fect be given to "judicial proceedings," and that arbitration is not
a "judicial proceeding : 47 The Court then stated that it would not
fashion a rule of preclusion in the case because the policy reasons
given in Gardner-Denver for rejecting the doctrines of election of
remedies and waiver were equally applicable to the doctrine of res
judicata.4 8
Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver to
the facts in Children's Hospital, it is clear that submitting the
Hospital employees' grievances to the Grievance Committee did not
constitute a voluntary and knowing waiver of their Title VII rights.
In the face of this apparent conflict with the Supreme Court, the
majority in Children's Hospital relied on the doctrine of res judicata
to precludt the employees' Title VII claims, rather than on choice
of remedies and waiver as applied in Gardner-Denver.49 As
previously noted, however, the distinction between waiver and res
judicata was found to be inconsequential by the Supreme Court
in McDonald.5 0 Thus, the result in Children's Hospital is not
justified by the court's reliance on res judicata. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit also distinguished Gardner-Denver on the ground
that a consent decree is not the same as a collective bargaining
agreement because a consent decree carries the stamp of judicial
approval. 51 The significance of this distinction is discussed
below. 5 2
B. Judicial Approval of the Grievance Procedure
Given the Supreme Court's refusal to give preclusive effect to
within the United States ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Trritory, or Possession from which
they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). The Full Faith and Credit Statute obliges federal courts to give a state
court judgment the same res judicata effect as it would be given in a court of the state. See
McDonald v. City of West Branch. 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1802 (1984); Migra v. Warren City School
Dist., 104 S. Ct. 892, 896 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,466 (1982).
47. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1802 (1984). The Court stated that
the plain language of § 1738 indicates that only "judicial proceedings" must be given preclusive
effect, but it gave no reasons for its conclusion that arbitration is not a "judicial proceeding:' Id.
48. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1802.n.8 (1984) (citing Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 39,49 n.10 (1974)). These policy reasons related primarily to the
inferiority of arbitration to a court proceeding. See supra note 37.
49. EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961,962-63
(9th Cir. 1982).
50. McDonald v. City of West Branch. 104 S. Ct. 1799. 1802 n.8. Note again that Children's
Hospital predates McDonald.
51. EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961, 962
(1982).
52. See infa text accompanying notes 53-69.
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an arbitral decision pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment,53 a threshold issue for consideration is whether a prior
adverse decision in another forum may ever bar a Title VII suit on
the same claim. In this regard, the Supreme Court has interpreted
Title VII to provide a private right of action to individuals claim-
ing to be victims of employment discrimination, and a correspon-
ding right to a trial de novo.54 However, the right to a trial de novo
on individual discrimination claims has been tempered somewhat
by two recent Supreme Court decisions in which the Court has held
that there is no absolute private right of action to litigate
discrimination claims in federal court. 55
In Allen v. McCurry, 56 a state criminal defendant brought an
action for damages under section 1983, claiming that the police
officers who arrested him had conspired to violate his fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable search-and-seizur
The Supreme Court held that the rule of issue preclusion barred
the defendant from relitigating the search-and-seizure issue in
federal court inasmuch as the same constitutional issue had
already been fully litigated in the state courts. 57
In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,58 the Court again
ruled to preclude relitigation of a state-tried civil rights claim in
federal court. The Court held that, under the Full Faith and Credit
Statute 59 Rubin Kremer's Title VII suit against the Chemical Con-
struction Corporation was barred by a New York trial court deci-
sion in a suit involving the same claim, but brought by Kremer
under the state statutory equivalent to Title VII. 60 The Supreme
Court found the federal action to be precluded even though the
state court had merely affirmed a state administrative agency's
decision that Kremer's discrimination claim was meritless. 6'
53. See supra text accompanying notes 33-48.
54. The Court has held that an individual may sue to vindicate his Title VII rights despite
an adverse decision on the same facts by a state administrative agency. Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 477 (1982): by a federal administrative agency. Chandler v.
Roudebush. 425 U.S. 840, 853-54 (1975); by an arbitrator. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415
U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974): and by the EEOC. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. 799
(1973). Furthermore, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency. Inc.. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). the Court
held that a federal court judgment denying an employee's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did
not bar the employee's Title VII claim based on the same events.
55. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90 (1980).
56. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
57. Id. at 100-05.
58. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
59. See supra note 46 for the pertinent text of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1982).
60. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 462-67 (1982).
61. Id. at 466-67.
130 [Vol. i:i
RES JUDICATA AND TITLE VII
Thus, despite the fact that the process accorded Kremer in the state
court was limited to a deferential review of the administrative
record without a full-scale judicial inquiry into Kremer's
discrimination claim,62 the Supreme Court refused to allow
Kremer to relitigate his claim in federal court under Title VII.
In Kremer, the Supreme Court distinguished Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver by noting that Kremer's statutory right to a trial
de novo was satisfied because there had been a prior judicial deci-
sion.63 The Ninth Circuit, in Children's Hospital, relied on this
aspect of Kremer to distinguish Gardner-Denver.64 It is important
to note, however, that the Supreme Court's holdings in Gardner-
Denver and McDonald v. City of West Branch were limited to the
preclusive effect of arbitral decisions under collective bargaining
agreements in employment discrimination cases. Children's
Hospital, on the other hand, involved an arbitral determination
made pursuant to a judicially approved consent decree. Thus, it
may be argued that Gardner-Denver was distinguishable fi'om
Children's Hospital because judicial approval of the Clayton de _ree
functioned as approval of decisions of the Grievance Committee
similar to the state court's approval of the administrative decision
involved in Kremer.
At first blush, the facts of Kremer and Children's Hospital ap-
pear quite similar. In Kremer, the same operative events were at
issue in the administrative proceeding as in the Title VII suit.65
Similarly, in Children's Hospital, the same operative events were
at issue in the grievance proceedings as in the Title VII suit.66 In
Kremer, the Supreme Court gave res judicata effect to what was
no more than a state court's deferential approval of an ad-
ministrative ruling.67 Therefore, it may be argued that, on the
authority of Kremer, res judicata effect was appropriately given
to the Grievance Committee decision in Children's Hospital because
the grievance procedure carried a stamp of judicial approval
similar to that given to the administrative ruling in Kremer.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, this analogy to Kremer fails
62. Id. at 482-85.
63. Id. at 477-78.
64. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961,963 (9th
Cir. 1982). The court stated that Kremer "eliminates any doubt that a federal court judgment
encompassing a Title VII claim precludes further pursuit of Title VII remedies with respect
to that claim:' Id.
65. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.. 456 U.S. 461, 463-65 (1982).
66. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961, 962 (9th
Cir. 1982).
67. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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because the facts in Children's Hospital were actually the opposite
of those in Kremer. In Kremer, res judicata effect was given to the
state court's approval of the administrative decision itself, not to
the state court's approval of the agency's right to decide
discrimination claims. Conversely, while the Clayton court approv-
ed the consent decree's grant of authority to the Grievance Com-
mittee there was no judicial approval of the Grievance Committee
decision on the claim litigated.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's post-Kremer decisions in
McDonald v. City of West Branch6 and Migra v. Warren City
School District Board of Education6 9 demonstrate that, in apply-
ing the Full Faith and Credit Statute to employment discrimina-
tion cases, the Court has drawn a clear distinction between giving
preclusive effect to arbitral decisions and giving preclusive effect
to state court judgments. Inasmuch as an arbitral decision is not
a "judicial proceeding," the Full Faith and Credit Statute does not
mandate that arbitral decisions be given preclusive effect.7 0
Thus, it is clear that giving res judicata effect to the Grievance
Committee decision in Children's Hospital was not the same as giv-
ing res judicata effect to the state court's approval of the ad-
ministrative determination in Kremer. Consequently, if preclusive
effect was being given to the Grievance Committee decision,
Kremer was not directly on point despite the Ninth Circuit's argu-
ment to the contrary. Instead, the Supreme Court's holding and
reasoning in Gardner-Denver should have been controlling in the
case because of the factual similarity of Gardner-Denver and
Children's Hospital. The Ninth Circuit, however, relied on Kremer,
not Gardner-Denver, and as a result, reached an erroneous
conclusion.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE CLAIM
If the Ninth Circuit in Children's Hospital was giving preclusive
effect to the Grievance Committee decision, its holding was seem-
ingly in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in
68. 104 S. Ct. 1799. 1802 (1984) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Statute does not
require federal courts to give preclusive effect to arbitration decisions).
69. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984). In Migra, a supervisor of elementary education obtained ajudg-
ment in an Ohio court for breach of contract and wrongful interference with her contract of
employment. Subsequently, the supervisor brought a § 1983 action based on the same claim.
The Supreme Court held that the state court judgment was entitled to preclusive effect under
the Full Faith and Credit Statute even though the discrimination claim had not been litigated.
Id. at 898.
70. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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9ardner-Denver.7 1 It, therefore, may be assumed that the court
was giving preclusive effect to the Clayton decree rather than the
arievance Committee decision. If so, the major difference between
the majority and the dissent was whether Children's Hospital and
Clayton involved the same claim.7 2 In this regard, the majority
simply assumed that both proceedings involved essentially the
same series of connected transactions.73 Judge Poole, in dissent,
contested the majority's assumption. He argued that the events
on which the two actions were based were necessarily different by
pointing out that the employees involved in Children's Hospital
were hired after entry of the Clayton decree and that the events
upon which their grievances and EEOC charges were based occurred
after they were hired.74 Indeed, notwithstanding the merits of
either the majority or the dissent's interpretation of the scope of
the claim in Clayton, it is clear that the Hospital employees' EEOC
charges were based on post-decree conduct.7 5
The best argument supporting the majority's unstated assump-
tion that Children's Hospital and Clayton involved the same claim
is that both proceedings arose from the same "series of connected
transactions" within the meaning of the Second Restatement of
Judgments.76 Section 24(1) of the Restatement provides that
"(w)hen a valid and final judgment rendered in an action ex-
tinguishes the plaintiff's claim .... the claim extinguished in-
cludes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of con-
nected transactions, out of which the action arose ' 77 Inasmuch
as the conduct at issue in the two proceedings was of the same
general type, it may be argued that the Hospital's continued viola-
tion of Title VII was no more than a series of connected transac-
tions. Comment d following section 24 seems to support this argu-
ment by providing that "(w)hen a defendant is accused of... acts
which though occurring over a period of time were substantially
71. See supra text accompanying notes 33-69.
72. See supra note 9 for the definition of "claim:'
73. A number of statements in the majority opinion indicate that the court thought Clayton
and Children's Hospital involved the same claim or series of connected transactions. For ex-
ample, the court stated that "here there is a prior judgment encompassing these Title VII
claims:' EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961,962 (9th
Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). The court also stated, in support of its holding, that "a federal
court judgment encompassing a Title VII claim precludes further pursuit of Title VII remedies
with respect to that claim:' Id. at 963.
74. Id. at 967-68 (Poole. J.. dissenting).
75. Id.
76. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24.
77. Id. at § 24(1).
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of the same sort and similarly motivated, fairness to the defen-
dant... may require that they be dealt with in the same ac-
tion"7 8 Thus, based on Restatement section 24, it may be argued
that Children's Hospital was correctly decided because the Hospital
was accused of conduct substantially similar to that adjudicated
in Clayton.
To accept this interpretation of the Restatement in Children's
Hospital, the temporal scope of the series of connected transac-
tions making up the claim in Clayton (in effect, the Hospital's con-
tinued violation of Title VII) must extend beyond the time of judg-
ment. In other words, the claim extinguished in Clayton included
events or transactions occurring after entry of the Clayton decree,
The better view, however, is that Clayton and Children's Hospital
involved different claims. Although the approach of the new
Restatement is an expansion of the traditional common law con-
ception of "claim" or "cause of action, ' 79 the American Law In-
stitute probably did not contemplate expansion of the temporal
limits of "claim" beyond the time when judgment is entered.8 0
Moreover, comment d indicates that the rationale for expanding
the outer limits of "claim" is fairness to the defendant.8 ' In-
asmuch as the conduct at issue in Children's Hospital occurred
after entry of the Clayton decree, it was not unfair to the Hospital
to subject it to liability for post-decree violations of Title VII
because those specific violations had never been adjudicated. On
the contrary, concluding that Children's Hospital and Clayton in-
volved the same claim seems unfair to the employees because the
precise conduct at issue in Children's Hospital could not have been
litigated in Clayton.
In addition to lacking persuasive support in the Restatement
itself, defining the claim in Clayton to include events occurring after
entry of judgment is at odds with two converging lines of Supreme
Court decisions. In one line of decisions the Court has held that
res judicata has no effect on rights arising from post-judgment
events. While neither Alexander v. Gardner-Denver nor Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corp. specifically dealt with the issue, the
Supreme Court has held in other contexts that claim preclusion
does not operate to bar rights arising subsequent to entry of a con-
78. Id. at § 24() comment d.
79. Id. § 24 reporter's note.
80. The Restatement was drafted by the American Law Institute.
81. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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sent decree or order. In commissioner v. Sunnen, 2 the Court held
that a judgment on the merits of a tax claim would not preclude
litigation of an identical claim of right arising in a later tax year.
Similarly, in Lawlor v. National Screen Services,8 3 the Court held
that a prior adverse judgment in an antitrust case did not prevent
the plaintiff from bringing a suit alleging post-judgment violations
of the antitrust laws. In Lawlor the claims involved essentially the
same kind of conduct adjudicated in the original action. The Court
stated that "while the 1943 judgment precludes recovery on claims
arising prior to its entry, it cannot be given the effect of ex-
tinguishing claims which do not even then exist and which could
not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case:"84 Conse-
quently, while the Supreme Court has noted that courts have an
obligation to "render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future:"85 Sunnen and Lawlor make it clear
that the availability of prospective relief does not prevent parties
to an action from bringing actions challenging post-decree viola-
tions of Title VII.
The Fourth Circuit applied Sunnen and Lawlor to a civil rights
class action in Crowe v. Leeke. 86 In Crowe, the court held that a
prior section 1983 class action consent judgment did not bar a
class member from bringing a subsequent section 1983 action to
challenge acts occurring after entry of the decree.8 7 According to
the court, claim preclusion "has very little applicability to a fact
situation involving a continuing series of acts, for generally each
act gives rise to a new cause of action"'8 8 Thus, Sunnen, Lawlor,
and Crowe clearly indicate that the Restatement definition of
"claim" should not be interpreted to include post-judgment events.
Futhermore, defining the claim in Clayton to include events oc-
curring after judgment is at odds with another line of Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court has held that public rights, in-
cluding Title VII rights, may not be waived prospectively. In
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil8 9 and Midstate Horticultural Co.
82. 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
83. 349 U.S. 322 (1955).
84. Id. at 328.
85. International Bhd. of lbamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324. 364 (1977) (citing Alber-
marle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
86. 550 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1977).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 187.
89. 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (in the absence of a bona fide dispute between employer and
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v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co.90 the Court held that when a statutory
right is conferred on an individual to effectuate a legislative policy,
the right may not be waived or released by him prospectively.9'
Given that Title VII rights are conferred on individuals to effec-
tuate the Congressional policy of remedying discrimination, 92 the
Court held in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver that Title VII rights may
not be waived prospectively in the collective bargaining process.93
The Court reasoned that the paramount Congressional purpose
behind Title VII is to insure that employees are to be free from
discriminatory practices, and that prospective waiver of Title VII
rights, even outside of the collective bargaining process, would
defeat this purpose.94
In Brooklyn Savings Bank, Midstate Horticultural Co., and
Gardner-Denver, the Court invalidated a contractual provision that
purported to waive prospectively a statutory right. Settlement
agreements are indistinguishable from the contracts in those cases
because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, for purposes
of enforcement, a consent decree is to be treated as a contract. 95
Thus, the gloss of judicial approval on the settlement agreement
does not take the consent decree outside of the rule that impor-
tant statutory rights, such as Title VII rights, cannot be waived pro-
spectively. In Children's Hospital, the Hospital employees were
hired after entry of the Clayton decree, and their Title VII claims
also arose after entry of the decree. Assuming that the majority
in Children's Hospital was giving preclusive effect to the decree,
employee, the employee's release of rights to liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act does not bar subsequent exercise of those rights).
90. 320 U.S. 356 (1943) (express agreement to shorten the statute of limitations under
the Interstate Commerce Act is void as against public policy).
91. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 401 U.S. 321 (1971) (rejects argu-
ment that release of onejoint tortfeasor in an antitrust suit operates to release all on the ground
that private suits are an essential weapon for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws): Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (agreement between seller and purchaser of securities to arbitrate
all future controversies arising from the transaction is void under § 14 of the 1933 Securities
Act which declares void any agreement "binding any person aquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision" in the Act); Redel's. Inc. v. General Electric Co.. 498 F.2d 95
(5th Cir. 1974) and Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Bd. of Trade. 386 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1967)
(settlements which absolve a party from liability for future violations of the antitrust laws
are clearly against public policy and. therefore, void as applied prospectively).
92. See supra note 2.
93. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver. 415 U.S. 36. 51 (1974.
94. Id.
95. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.. 420 U.S. 223. 236-37 (1975); United
States v. Armour.& Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co.. 360 U.S.
19 (1959): Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952). But cf. United States v. Swift & Co..
286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932) (for purposes of modification, a consent decree is to be treated as
a judicial act rather than a contract).
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the court improperly sanctioned prospective waiver of Title VII
rights. The majority opinion is, therefore in conflict with the
holdings of the Supreme Court in Brooklyn Savings Bank, Midstate
Horticultural Co., and Gardner-Denver.
In summary, the Restatement's definition of claim should not
be interpreted to extinguish rights arising after the time of judg-
ment because the Supreme Court has held that res judicata has
no effect on claims arising from post-judgment events. Conse-
quently, the Ninth Circuit should have concluded that Children's
Hospital Medical Center and Clayton involved different claims.
Moreover, barring the Title VII rights asserted in Children's
Hospital sanctioned the prospective waiver of public rights in con-
travention of the Supreme Court's position on the issue. Inasmuch
as the employees were alleging discriminatory practices by the
Hospital subsequent to entry of the decree their complaints could
not have been raised in the Clayton action. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit should have held that the Title VII rights asserted in
Children's Hospital were not extinguished by settlement of the
Clayton claim.
V. FUTURE EMPLOYEES BRINGING A TITLE VII ACTION BASED ON THE SAME
CLAIM
A. The Preclusive Effect of the Consent Decree
Although the Ninth Circuit should have concluded that
Children's Hospital and Clayton involved different claims,96 there
may be other instances when future employees included in a class
action consent judgment bring a subsequent Title VII action bas-
ed on the same claim. For the sake of discussion, it will be assum-
ed that the majority in Children's Hospital was correct in implici-
tly holding that the two proceedings involved the same series of
connected transactions. 97 Viewed as such, the persuasiveness of
the majority's res judicata analysis turns on whether the consent
decree satisfied the Title VII trial de novo requirement. In other
words, even if Children's Hospital and Clayton involved the same
claim, the Hospital employees hired after entry of the decree were
entitled to a trial de novo under Title VII.9 8 Thus, if the consent
decree itself was not the equivalent of a trial de novo, then the
Hospital employees have the right to litigate their Title VII claims
96. See supra text accompanying notes 71-94.
97. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
98. See generally supra note 50 and cases cited therein.
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in federal court. Although both sides of the issue are analyzed in
this Comment, it is argued herein that a class action consent decree
satisfies the trial de novo right of future employees included in the
class.99
The majority in Children's Hospital stated that Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corp. "eliminates any doubt that a federal
court judgment encompassing a Title VII action precludes further
pursuit of Title VII remedies with respect to the claim.' 0 0
Nonetheless, Kremer does not necessitate the conclusion that a
class action consent decree qualifies as a trial de novo within the
meaning of Title VII. I° 1 In Kremer, the court's decision to bar
Rubin Kremer's Title VII suit rested heavily on a perceived con-
flict between Title VII and the Full Faith and Credit Statute. 0 2
The Court held that without an affirmative showing of a clear and
manifest Congressional purpose to impliedly repeal the Full Faith
and Credit Statute as applied to state court discrimination deci-
sions, it would not recognize an exception to the rule of preclusion
in the Statute.1 0 3 The Court enunciated two important considera-
tions in its decision: (1) the policy of promoting the spirit of comi-
ty between federal and state courts that underlies the Full Faith
and Credit Statute;10 4 and (2) the Congressional intent to give ef-
fect to state nondiscrimination laws. 0 5 Accommodating these
federalism concerns, the Court held that the state administrative
and judicial adjudication of Kremer's employment discrimination
claim satisfied the Title VII trial de novo requirement. 0 6
The federalism concerns of the Kremer Court, however, have
no application in a Title VII case involving the preclusive effect of
a consent decree approved by a federal court. Given the importance
of these federalism concerns in Kremer, it is not at all clear that
the Court would have ruled that a federal court's approval of a class
action consent decree satisfies the trial de novo requirement. Thus,
99. See infra text accompanying notes 99-167.
100. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961.963 (9th
Cir. 1982).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 53-69 for a discussion of Kremer in another
context.
102. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.. 456 U.S. 461. 466-77 (1982).
103. Id. at 485.
104. Id. at 478. See also Migra v. Warren City School Dist.. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984) (stating
that the Full Faith and Credit Statute -embodies the view that it is more important to give
full faith and credit to state-court judgments than to ensure separate forums for federal and
state claims").
105. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.. 456 U.S. 461, 472 (1982).
106. Id. at 476-78.
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the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Kremer to support its holding in
Children's Hospital extended the Kremer holding significantly
beyond its rationale.
In addition, Judge Poole, dissenting in Children's Hospital,
argued that giving preclusive effect to the Clayton decree ignored
the principle that a consent decree is to be treated as a contract
for purposes of interpretation and enforcement.'0 7 While Judge
Poole did not elaborate any further, he was apparently arguing
that, construed as a contract, the Clayton decree was less
analogous to the state court judgment in Kremer than the majori-
ty implied. This argument, although deceptively appealing, subt-
ly misses the mark because the majority in Children's Hospital was
giving preclusive effect to the Clayton court's approval of the set-
tlement agreement, not the agreement itself. Similarly, the
Supreme Court in Kremer gave preclusive effect to the state court's
approval of the administrative determination, not the determina-
tion itself or the agency's authority to decide employment
discrimination cases. Thus, in both Children's Hospital and
Kremer, preclusive effect was given to a priorjudicial determina-
tion. In addition, the Kremer Court placed considerable emphasis
on the procedural safeguards built into New York's administrative
code.10 8 Certainly, a federal court's procedure in deciding whether
to approve a class action settlement is the equivalent of a state
court's approval of an administrative determination. Thus, not-
withstanding Judge Poole's argument to the contrary, the Clayton
decree indeed may have satisfied the Kremer interpretation of the
trial de novo requirement.
In further support of the proposition that a class action con-
sent decree satisfies the trial de novo requirement of Title VII, it
may be argued that class member employees, hired after entry of
a decree, voluntarily and knowingly consent to its preclusive ef-
fect.10 9 In Children's Hospital, the Ninth Circuit implicitly ac-
cepted this argument by stating that the constitutional due pro-
cess rights of the Hospital employees were not violated because
the employees (1) knew of the decree; (2) had not raised any objec-
107. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961. 966
(Poole. J.. dissenting) (citing United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.. 420 U.S. 223 (1975)).
108. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.. 456 U.S. 461. 483-85 (1982).
109. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver. 418 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974). in which the Supreme
Court stated that "('p)resumably an employee may waive his cause of action under Title VII
as part of a voluntary settlement:' but the employee's consent to waiver must be "voluntary
and knowing:' Id. The Court, however, did not define "voluntary and knowing" consent. See
also supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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tions to its terms; and (3) were adequately represented in the
Clayton action." 0
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver makes this argument no less per-
suasive. To some extent, of course, the facts of Gardner-
Denver are very similar to Children's Hospital. Just as the
employees in Children's Hospital raised no objections to the
Clayton decree, there is no record in Gardner-Denver that the
employees of the Gardner-Denver Company raised any objections
to the nondiscrimination clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Indeed, although the Court in Gardner-Denver did not define
voluntary and knowing consent, it unequivocally held that sub-
mission of a claim to arbitration and employee acquiescense to
the terms of a contract negotiated for their benefit by the union
does not constitute a waiver of Title VII rights."' Unlike Clayton
and Children's Hospital, however, Gardner-Denver did not involve
a class action. While the issue in Gardner-Denver was whether the
employees consented to an unexpressed waiver of Title VII rights
in a collective bargaining agreement, the issue in Children's
Hospital was whether members of a rule 23 class consented to a
judicially-approved consent decree. Subdivision (c)(3) of rule 23
provides that a class action judgment is binding on all members
of the class, whether favorable or not." 2 To give effect to rule 23,
consent to waiver of Title VII rights arising out of the claim involv-
ed in the class adjudication should be implied when the individual
class members were adequately represented by the named
plaintiffs. 113
The Ninth Circuit argued that if the consent decree was not
given the same preclusive effect as the state court judgment in
Kremer, there would be little incentive for employers to settle Title
VII cases. 114 In this regard, the court stated that in a Title VII
class action the consent decree's preclusive effect on the claims
of absent class members is a major factor inducing employer defen-
dants to settle.115 In Gardner-Denver, on the other hand, even
assuming that the employer's agreement to the broad arbitration
clause in the collective bargaining agreement was expressly con-
110. EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961.964 (9th
Cir. 1982).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
112. See supra note 9 for the text of rule 23(c)(3).
113. See supra note 108.
114. EEOCv.C hildren's Hosp. Medical Center. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961. 963 (9th
Cir. 1982].
115. Id.
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ditioned on waiver of Title VII rights,116 the employer had other
material incentives to agree to an arbitration clause 1 17 Specifical-
ly, in collective bargaining, the employer receives the benefit of a
no-strike pledge from the union as the quid pro quo for inclusion
of a broad arbitration clause in the contract. 1" 8 The union's pro-
mise not to strike is a very valuable concession to the employer,
and provides the employer sufficient economic incentive to agree
to the broad arbitration clause. In the context of a class action set-
tlement, however, the major incentive for the employer to agree to
the terms of a consent decree is the decree's preclusive effect. If
the consent judgment does not shield the employer-defendant from
individual Title VII actions based on the same claim, the employer
will be much less inclined to voluntarily agree not to discriminate
Given the importance of encouraging voluntary settlement of
discrimination claims in the overall remedial scheme of Title
VII,"19 future employees included in the class should be con-
sidered to have voluntarily and knowingly waived' 20 all Title VII
rights arising out of a previously adjudicated claim when they are
notified of the class action consent decree including them in the
class. These class members, however, would retain all Title VII
rights arising from post-judgment events involving employer con-
duct that was not part of the series of connected transactions ad-
judicated in the prior action.' 2 ' Moreover, the employees could
still obtain judicial review of the consent judgment if their interests
were not adequately represented by the class representatives in
this action.' 22 Thus, the class action consent judgment would
preclude the Title VII action of future employees only if the
employees (1) sought to relitigate the same series of connected
transactions; and (2) were adequately represented in the prior
action.
In summary, all rights of future employees included in the class
arising out of the same series of connected transactions at issue
in the class action should be extinguished by the consent judg-
116. In fact it was not. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 418 U.S. 36. 52 n.15 (1974).
117. Similar to the Title VII policy of encouraging settlement of employment discrimina-
tion claims, a fundamental policy of federal labor law is to encourage voluntary settlement
of industrial disputes by arbitration. See L. MODJESKA. NLRB PRACTICE 315 (1983) and cases
cited therein.
118. See Boys Markets. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
119. See supra text accompanying note 3.
120. See supra note 108 and text accompanying notes 43-45.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 71-94.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 123-67.
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ment. Despite the federalism considerations in Kremer,'23 that
case should be read broadly to mean that a class action consent
judgment rendered by a federal court extinguishes all Title VII
rights arising out of the same claim. A narrower reading of Kremer
is inconsistent with the doctrine of res judicata embodied in rule
23 and the Title VII policy of encouraging settlements.
B. The Propriety of Including Future Employees in a Class
Action Consent Judgment
A decision to preclude the Title VII action of an individual
because of a class action consent decree entered into prior to the
individual's employment by the employer-defendant raises issues
concerning individual notice under rule 23 and the United States
Constitution. In Hansberry v. Lee, 1 2 4 the Supreme Court held that
the adjudication of the claims of unnamed class members does not
violate their Constitutional due process rights so long as their in-
terests are adequately represented. Determining whether the nam-
ed parties adequately represent the interests of unnamed class
members, however, is a difficult task. The difficulty in determin-
ing adequacy of representation creates a significant amount of
uncertainty about the preclusive effect of the class action judg-
ment. 125 This, in turn, invites collateral attack by dissatisfied
class members and discourages reliance by the employer-
defendant.' 26 Thus, the preclusive effect of a class action judg-
ment makes the question of adequacy of representation very im-
portant, especially when future employees are included in the
class.
Federal courts have split on the issue of whether it is proper
to include future employees in a rule 23 class.' 27 In these cases,
123. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
124. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
125. Rutherglen, supra note 4. at 75.
126. Id. The res judicata effect of ajudgment can only be determined in a subsequent pro-
ceeding. See C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER. supra note 4, at § 1789. An attack on a judgment in a subse-
quent procedure is commonly called a "collateral attack." See 1B J. MOORE. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 0.407 (2d ed. 1984) ("A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade a judicial
decree, or deny its force and effect in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the
express purpose of attacking it.') See also Note Binding Effect of Class Actions. 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1059. 1060 (1954).
127. For cases including future employees in the class, see: Hebert v. Monsanto Co.. 682
F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1982); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.. 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978):
Black Grievance Committee v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 79 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1978): Woffard v.
Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460 (N.D. Cal. 1978): Inmates. D.C. Jail v. Jackson. 416 F. Supp. 119
(D.D.C. 1976): Branham v. General Elec., 63 F.R.D. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). See also cases cited
in Rutherglen. supra note 4, at 44 n.127.
For cases refusing to include future employees in the class, see: Edwards v. Schlesinger.
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the underlying question is whether unnamed class members must
receive notice of the action or a proposed settlement to be bound
by the judgment. Arguably, future employees included in the class
have the right under subdivision (e) of rule 23 to be notified prior
to a settlement.' 28 It may also be argued that including unnamed
class members in a rule 23(b)(2) class action, without giving them
notice of the action and the right to opt out of the class, violates
their Constitutional right to due process of law.'
29
There are no controlling Constitutional decisions on whether
actual notice of a proposed settlement must be given to unnamed
class members to protect their Constitutional due process
rights. :0 Subdivision (e) of rule 23 requires the court to give class
members notice of a proposed compromise or dismissal in such
manner as the court directs. ,3 1 Some courts have held that this
provision of rule 23 requires prior notice to class members before
a proposed settlement is approved.' 32 Because by definition
future class members are not identified before a settlement is ap-
proved, it is impossible for the court to notify them of the propos-
ed compromise. 33 Therefore, it may be argued that inasmuch as
it is impossible to give prior notice to future class members, any
class action settlement that purports to extinguish their rights
violates rule 23(e).' 3 4 If this argument is accepted, the com-
plainants in Children's Hospital were improperly included in the
Clayton class because they were not employed by the Hospital at
the time of judgment. Consequently, the Clayton action did not ex-
tinguish their Title VII rights.
The better rule, however, is that, even without prior notice,
future employees are bound by the class action judgment so long
377 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1974). rev'd on other grounds. 509 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1974): Harvey
v. Stein Printing Co.. 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1072 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See also cases cited
in Rutherglen. supra note 4. at 44 n.125.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 129-44.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 145-67.
130. See MA,.t AL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.45 (1982).
131. Subdivision (e) provides that. **A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court. and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs:* FED. R. CiV. P. 23(e).
132. See. eg.. Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co.. 635 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1981); Kemp
v. Birmingham News Co.. 608 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1979); Quigiey v. Braniff Airways. Inc.. 85
F.R.D. 74 (N.D. Tex. 1979): Johnson v. General Motors Corp.. 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979); Sertic
v. Cuyahoga. Lake. Geauga and Ashtabula Counties Carpenters and Joiners Dist. Council. 459
F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972).
133. Hansberry v. Lee. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). however, does not require giving notice when
it is not feasible to do so. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.45 (1982.
134. Cf. Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co.. 634 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (claim preclusion does
not bar action if notice of prior class action judgment was inadequate).
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as the evidence indicates that their interests were adequately
represented. One of the chief abuses that rule 23 was designed to
prevent is prejudice to the rights of individual class members aris-
ing from a lack of notice of the class action.'3 5 Professors Wright
and Miller state, however, that there is authority for the proposi-
tion that failure to give notice of settlement is not error when the
rights of the absent class members are not prejudiced.' 36 Further-
more, rule 23, by its own terms, presupposes that notice of a pro-
posed settlement is not a precondition to court approval of that
settlement.' 37 Subdivision (e) merely requires that notice be given
as the court directs. 138
Requiring notice of the action and a proposed settlement af-
fords unnamed class members the opportunity to raise objections
so that the court can adequately evaluate any potential prejudice
to their rights. Failure to give notice prior to entry of a consent
decree, however, does not necessarily prejudice the rights of in-
dividual class members.' 39 If future class members have objec-
tions to the settlement, they may petition the court supervising
enforcement of the decree for a modification to account for chang-
ed circumstances.' 40 For example, in a Title VII class action, such
as Children's Hospital, the court may evaluate objections raised
during the life of the decree and decide whether the decree ade-
quately protects the interests of the employees hired after entry
of the decree.1 4 ' In Children's Hospital, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the Hospital employees received notice of the decree at the
time they were hired.' 42 The court also noted that the employees
made no allegation that they were not adequately represented in
Clayton;'4 3 nor did the employees raise any issues that had not
135. See Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 995 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 382 U.S. 941 (19651;
Craftsman Fin. & Mortgage Co. v. Brown. 64 F. Supp. 168. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
136. See 7A C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER. supra note 5. § 1797, at 234 (1972 & Supp. 1983). See
also Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n. 264 F. Supp. 915.917 (D. Del. 1966); Cohn
v. Columbia Pictures Corp.. 9 F.R.D. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
137. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.45 (1982).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
139. Zients v. LaMorte. 459 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1972).
140. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Swift & Co.. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). stated that
-(A) court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that what
it has been doing has been turned through changed circumstances into an instrument of
wrong." Id. at 114-15. See also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.. 391 U.S. 244
(1968); State v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855); Safe Flight In-
strument Corp. v. United Control. 576 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir 1978); 7 J. MOORE. MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE J 60.16(6), n.1 (2d ed. 1983).
141. See EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961.964
(9th Cir. 1982).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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been considered by the district court in Clayton.144 Therefore, the
court correctly reasoned that treating the future employees as
class members did not prejudice their rights under rule 23.145
Alternatively, it may be argued that including future employees
in a rule 23(b)(2) class violates their constitutional due process
rights. When a class is certified under subdivision (b)(3) of rule
23, the court is required to give absent class members notice and
the right to opt out of the class.146 However, rule 23 does not ex-
pressly require either notice or the right to opt out in class actions
certified under subdivision (b)(2).14 7 Nevertheless, some federal
courts have held that the federal Constitution requires notice and
the right to opt out of the class in subdivision (b) (2) class ac-
tions.148 According to these courts, an individual's due process
rights are violated if the individual is not given a choice of whether
to be included in the class. 149 Inasmuch as future class members
are not identified before certification of the class, they could not
be given notice of their right to opt out of the class. Consequently,
it may be argued that including them in the class violates their
constitutional rights.
Other courts have held that there is no constitutional right to
opt out of a subdivision (b)(2) class. 150 This view seems to be the
better one. The Supreme Court held in Hansberry v. Lee that the
constitutional due process rights of absent class members are
satisfied if the interests of the individual class members were ade-
quately represented in the class action. 151 The Hansberry deci-
sion, however, did not involve future class members, and therefore,
is not directly on point. Nonetheless, subdivision (a) of rule 23 re-
quires a finding of adequate representation as a precondition to
certification of the class. 5 2 The significance of this requirement
was explained in the recent Supreme Court decision General
Telephone Co. v. Falcon.15 3 The Court held that federal district
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See FEo. R. Civ P. 23(c)(2). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 417 U.S. 156, 177
n.14 (1974).
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The Supreme Court. in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 417
U.S. 156 (1974). expressed no opinion on whether the Constitution required notice and the
right to opt out.
148. See 7A C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER. supra note 4. § 1786, at 149-50 (Supp. 1983). and cases
cited therein.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Hansberry v. Lee. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
152. See supra note 14 for the text of rule 23(a).
153. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
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courts must carefully consider the adequacy of representation
question in each individual case. 54 It stated that the factors
which must be considered when making this determination are (1)
the qualifications of the named parties to represent the class; and
(2) the competency and experience of the legal counsel rep-
resenting the class.1 55
The adequacy of representation requirement functions as a pro-
cedural safeguard to the rights and interests of absent class
members. As the Advisory Committee has recognized, class action
adjudications under subdivision (b)(2) do not present the same
dangers of prejudice to individual rights as do class actions cer-
tified under subdivision (b)(3).156 Indeed, the provision in rule 23
requiring notice and the right to opt out in class actions certified
under subdivision (b)(3) is a reflection of the Advisory Commit-
tee's fear that in those cases the interests of individual class
members may differ significantly. 5 7
Notice gives individual class members the ability to apprise the
court of their various interests. In turn, the court can accurately
determine whether the individual interests of members of the pro-
posed class are sufficiently similar to justify maintenance of the
action as a class action. The right to opt out of the class allows
any individual class member who does not want his interests and
rights concluded in the class proceeding to exclude himself from
the class. With the notice and opt out requirements, the Advisory
Committee felt that the court could make a more accurate evalua-
tion of the adequacy of representation of unnamed class members'
interests.15 8
In contrast to actions certified under subdivision (b)(3), an
employment discrimination class action that seeks only injunc-
tive relief gives the court little reason to fear inadequate represen-
tation because the class as a whole shares the common interest
of being free from employment discrimination. Consequently, the
Advisory Committee did not require notice in class actions certified
under subdivision (b)(2).' 5 9 Moreover, if the factors listed in
154. In General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). the Supreme Court reversed the
certification of a Title VII class action because the district court had failed to -evaluate carefully
the legitimacy of the named plaintiff's plea that he is a proper representative under rule 23(a):'
Id. at 160.
155. Id.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 69. 104-05 (1966).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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General Telephone Co. are carefully evaluated in each case, 160 the
court can accurately determine whether the interests of future
class members are adequately represented. Thus, the adequacy of
representation requirement in rule 23 sufficiently protects the
rights and interests of future employees included in the class.
There is, therefore, no need for a constitutional requirement that
notice be given to future employees in Title VII class actions, or
that they be given a right to opt out of the class.
If future employees receive the benefit of a class action judg-
ment, they should be included in the class and bound.by the judg-
ment. Failure to bind future employees results in the instability
of class action judgments, and the same type of unfairness to the
employer-defendant that the 1966 amendments to rule 23 were
designed to prevent.1 6 1 Prior to 1966, rule 23 allowed the court to
decide the merits of a class action before deciding who would be
included in the class. 62 Many courts allowed potential class
members to intervene in the action once the liability of the defen-
dant was established. 163 By waiting until the merits of the action
were decided before including themselves in the class, potential
class members could benefit from a favorable judgment without
being bound by an unfavorable one 164 To alleviate this problem,
the Advisory Committee amended rule 23 to require the court to
determine the scope of the class before reaching the merits, and
to give preclusive effect to class action judgments. 6 5
However, the same sort of unfairness to the defendant that the
Advisory Committee meant to eliminate results if future employees
are not bound by a Title VII class action judgment. Under Title VII,
the court has an obligation to use its equity power to remedy past
discrimination and eliminate similar discrimination in the
futur. 16 6 Consequently, the equitable remedies provided by the
court in a class action suit will benefit future employees whether
or not they are formally included in the class. 67 Moreover, if
future employees are not included in the class, they will not be
bound by an adverse judgment. 168 They, therefore, will not be
160. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
161. Cf. Rutherglen. supra note 4. at 75.
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 69. 105-06 (1966).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324. 364 (1977)-
167. See Branham v. General Elec. Co.. 63 F.R.D. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Harvey v. Stein
Printing Co.. 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1072 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
168. See id.
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precluded from relitigating the claim adjudicated in the prior ac-
tion. Such a result is manifestly unfair to the employer-defendant
because the employer is bound by an unfavorable judgment, but
unable to fully take advantage of a favorable one
VI. CONCLUSION
Settlement of Title VII disputes prior to extensive discovery and
trial allows victims of employment discrimination the ability to
receive the remedial benefits of the Act sooner than if the case were
fully litigated. Adjudicating Title VII rights in a class action con-
sent decree, however, can unfairly prejudice the rights of future
employees. Courts can avoid the potential unfairness of binding
future employees in class action judgments by (1) limiting the
claim extinguished in the class action to pre-judgment events; and
(2) carefully scrutinizing the adequacy of the class representatives.
Inasmuch as future employees receive the benefit of the injunc-
tive relief provided by the class action consent decree they likewise
should be bound by the judgment.
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